Quʹest-ce que lʹêre? Cette question passe pour fonder la philosophie. Encore faut-il s'entendre sur le sens du mot "être ". L'essence des choses détermine-t-elle leur existence? Devons-nous affirmer, au contraire, que l'existence conditionne l'intensité d'être qui qualifie une certaine réalité? Molla Sadr Shirazi, dans ce traité écrit en Iran au siècle de Descartes et de Leibniz, médite ces questions qui sont encore les nôtres. Mais les solutions qu'il propose s'évadent hors de nos perspectives, après avoir opéré une révolution décisive dans (...) la métaphysique des Orientaux. Penseur shi'ite en butte à la persécution, Molla Sadra est la plus haute figure de la philosophie iranienne islamique au temps splendide de la cour safavide d'Ispahan. Sa doctrine du primat de l'existence, que le présent ouvrage expose complètement, ouvre sur une interprétation spirituelle de la résurrection des corps. Cette traduction par Henry Corbin, qui fut aussi l'éditeur du texte original, a fait événement : par son ample introduction, il situe la question de l'être et déploie une explication comparée de ce que l'Occident grec puis médiéval en ont fait, avec la tradition shi'iite. -- Back cover. (shrink)

The central issue in this work is self-knowledge. The human soul is created in the Image of God with a purpose.

The author gives a clear explanation of the philosophy of Sard al-Din Shirazi.

Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any (...) difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. (shrink)

Islamic thought, no matter what tradition it belonged to, went through a process in which almost all thinkers after the twelfth century were also commentators of Avicenna (d. 428/1037). When this phenomenon combined with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (d. 606/1210) ability to problematize, his critical readings revealed the aporias and turned them into problems which would occupy the thinker’s mind after him and waiting to be solved. The quiddityof knowledge has an important place among these, both in terms of being closely (...) related to many issues where ontology, epistemology and axiology intersect and being a problem area where the Islamic intellectual traditions’ conception of existence is directly reflected. As seen in the analyses of many thinkers, notably Râzî, the ontology, quiddity and category of knowledge in Avicennian philosophy contain elements that are conducive to encountering important challenges when the system as a whole is taken into consideration. Accordingly, scholars like Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānî (ö. 749/1349), al-Taftāzānī (ö. 792/1390), al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (ö. 816/1413), Alî al-Qūshjī (ö. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (ö. 908/1502), Sadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (ö. 903/1498) have taken the discussion to a further point both in terms of identifying the problem and revealing its implications and proposing solutions. This study aims to analyze the sixteenth-century thinker Kutb al-Dīn al-Ījī’s treatment of this problem who inherited the debates of past on the matter in question. He carries out his evaluations especially through the Alī al-Qūshjī (ö. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (ö. 908/1502) and al-Dashtakī’s comments on the subject. He makes important contributions by analyzing these scholars’ solution offers con-cerning the problem of categorical status of knowledge and putting forward his own approach. He thinks that Alī al-Qūshjī’s distinction between realization (husūl) and subsistence (qiyām), al-Dashtakī’s theory of transformation and al-Dawwānī’s offer to not put the knowledge under the category of quality are problematic from various aspects. (shrink)

Çalışmanın konusunu Seyyid Burhaneddin’de ahlakî arınmanın incelenmesi teşkil etmektedir. İnceleme üç temel soru çerçevesinde yürütülür. İlk soru, kirlerin neler olduğu ve nelerin bu kirlerden arındırılması gerektiğine yöneliktir. Bu bağlamda Seyyid Burhaneddin’in beden, dünya, nefs, gönül, can, ruh vb. hususlarla alakalı görüşleri ele alınmaktadır. Diğer bir soru ise söz konusu arınmanın nasıl gerçekleştirileceğine ilişkindir ki Seyyid Burhaneddin’in mücahede, riyazat, söz, bilgi gibi kavramlara dair görüşleri doğrultusunda bir yanıt verilmeye çalışılır. Arınmanın ve buna binaen yetkinleşmenin sonucu kişinin ulaşacağı mertebe ne olacaktır? Son (...) olarak da bu soru çerçevesinde Seyyid Burhaneddin’in düşüncelerinin değerlendirilmesine çalışılmakta ve insanın beka ve ebediyete kavuşması ve namütenahi bir biçimde Allah’ta seyredişi ele alınmaktadır. (shrink)

Sayyid Sadr al-din Mohammad Dashtaki Shirazi is the inventor of the division of composition into unified composition and composition by join. With this division, Dashtaki has expressed a new theory about the composition of the material object from first matter and form, as well as the composition of man from soul and body, and considers these compositions as an alliance and unification, not simply the parts joining to each other. In this paper, we will present Dashtaki’s arguments on the (...) theory of unified composition. We will also examine three objections to this theory and responses to them. Finally, we will examine the background of this theory in Bahmanyar's phrases. Dashtaki believes that when the components in the compound have a real plurality, i.e. each one exists separately from the other, a composition by join is created, such as the composition of a house from numerous clays. But if the components in the compound are united and none of them are separate from the others and exists actually, the resulting composition will be an alliance and union. He believes that in the unified composition, every component is identical to any other component and is identical to the whole. Accordingly, Reza is a unique being, both human and writer. In order to achieve a composition, a plurality is needed and in order to form a single composition, there must be plural components related to each other. An important question is that, principally how is a composition possible, if unified composition comes to existence only when the components are made united with each other and with the whole? In other words, unified composition is not possible, because the first condition of the acquisition of the composition, i.e., the plurality of the constituent components, is not satisfied. Dashtaki strives to express a difference between the components in the union compound. He believes that the conditions of the realization and the survival of the components are different, and that is enough for them to be different. In Dashtaki's point of view, in the unified composition the components are analytical, not being separate and plural, in reality. In other words, the components do not have actual and "in-the-world" plurality, which means that it is our intellect that separates them and looks at them as independent objects. Therefore, unity and identity are in-the-world and plurality and discernibility are analytical and in the mind. Dashtaki's first argument for his theory in general is as follows: the three major material objects (solid, plant and animal) are undoubtedly real compounds. But in these compositions, components exist potentially, and in a unified composition, components do not exist actually. Therefore, these objects are unified compounds. The second argument is that the accuracy of predication implies unity. In the unified composition, the components are identical with the whole, and therefore, the components can be predicated to the composition. In Dashtaki's view, if A is predicated to B, then it could be concluded that they are identical and unified. The first objection to this theory is that the unity is incompatible with causality. From the perspective of the Peripatetics, form is the cause of the matter, and this is incompatible with the union of the two. Dashtaki states that in case of causality, there is no need for cause and effect to be two different and discernible entities, but a single entity may be from one aspect the cause and, from another, the effect. In other words, the foresaid causality is analytical causality. When mind analyses something, and then finds analytical components, it can see between those analytical and intellectual components, causality, and find some of them as the cause of the others. The second objection is the incorrectness of the unity in compounds with components not being similar. only in the compounds having similar parts, one can accept the unity of matter and form. For example, in compounds such as horses, it is not possible to accept the union of matter and form, because in horses, there are components with different natures, such as bones, flesh and nerves. Unity of These parts with each other and with the whole is not plausible. Dashtaki’s respond is that the horse is also a natural unit and has no actual plurality. Components having similar or different natures does not make any difference. According to the theory of unified composition, the horse's components are united with the horse's form and have only analytical plurality. Horse’s components are just analytical components, not actual, independent ones. The third objection is the incompatibility of the actual existence of components with their unity. But Dashtaki maintains that a unique actual personal entity cannot have actual plural components. He states that compounds such as horses exist objectively, but objective and real existing is divided into two kinds: dependent existence, and independent existence as a single real thing. Therefore, the two characteristics of "being a component" and "being independent" are incompatible and do not come together in a real being. Dashtaki has also quoted phrases from Bahmanyar to confirm his point of view. Bahmanyar says that the properties of an animal belong to the whole and compound, not to each component. For example, it is a horse that feels, not its bone or brain, as the eye is also a compound, but seeing is the work of the eye, not the work of any of its components. Therefore, the animal, which is something compound, has characteristics that none of its components have. So the animal is something over and above its components. Bahmanyar thinks the components in the animal are potential. Then he states a general rule: any compound in which unity is real, its components do potentially exist. Therefore, Bahmanyar considers the body parts of the living organism as a potential being and generally believes that the components of any compound that have true unity are potential. The potentiality of the components in a real compound does not that mean that the components are destroyed and a new thing is produced. The components are also available, but they do not have the effects they had separately before the composition comes into existence. In other words, the components have found a unique identity together and therefore have a new effect.. It seems that Bahmanyar has expressed the same idea that Dashtaki is looking for in the theory of unified composition. Therefore, it can be said that before Dashtaki, Bahmanyar has come up with the thought of a unity. Of course, Bahmanyar has not explained much about this, and Dashtaki is the first who has organized and completed this idea as a philosophical theory. (shrink)

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) was a pan-Islamic thinker, political activist, and journalist, who sought to revive Islamic thought and liberate the Muslim world from Western influence. Many aspects of his life and his background remain unknown or controversial, including his birthplace, his religious affiliation, and the cause of his death. He was likely born in Asadabad, near present-day Hamadan, Iran. His better known history begins when he was 18, with a one-year stay in India that coincided with the Sepoy Mutiny (...) of 1857-59. In what would become a life of constant travel, he soon went to Mecca to perform Hajj, before returning to Afghanistan to join the service of the country's ruler, Dost Mohammad Khan (1793-1863). He later sided with Dost's son Mohammad Aʻzam, who ultimately lost in a power struggle with his British-supported brother Sher Ali. Al-Afghani's political activism eventually took him to Paris, London, Tehran, Saint Petersburg, and Constantinople. It was during his second stay in Egypt (1871-79) that he cemented his role as a reformer. He found in Cairo a class of young intellectuals who gathered around him, established newspapers, and used these papers to disseminate his ideas. Chief among al-Afghani's Egyptian disciples were scholar Muhammad ʻAbduh, journalist ʻAbd Allah al-Nadim, and nationalist politicians Mustafa Kamil and Saʻd Zaghlul. Al-Afghani's influence on both modernist and traditionalist Islamic thought continues to the present. An activist who sought to effect change through political journalism and public speaking, he did not write many books. This treatise, entitled al-Radd ʻalā al-dahrīyīn (Refutation of the materialists), was a rebuttal of the views of the pro-British Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who had argued that science is more important than religion in the rise of civilizations. First written in Persian following al-Afghani's exile from Egypt to India, it was translated into Arabic by his student Muhammad ʻAbduh, with the help of al-Afghani's assistant Arif Efendi. (shrink)

Introduces young readers to Ibn Sina, telling his story as he might tell it himself. It provides a fascinating glimpse into the life of this philosopher, scientist and physician who was one of the greatest thinkers of his time.

In The Sufi Doctrine of Man , Richard Todd examines the life and thought of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī , Ibn 'Arabī's chief disciple and a key figure in the development of Sufi metaphysics.

The paper explores the role and meaning of maṣlaḥa and its possible appropriation in the field of Islamic legal and economic thought, as laid down by various medieval and contemporary Muslim scholars. Questions that are pertinent to the research are the following: how has maṣlaḥa been incorporated in legal reasoning and what kind of meaning does it convey; what type of economic reading does it presuppose; do ethics, law, and scriptural sources play equally important role as reference in developing the (...) concept in economic terms, are some of the questions that this paper will try to provide answer to. Further, as there is a tendency to believe that Islamic economic thought cannot be equated only with legal and juridical underpinnings, it is pertinent to pose a question if economic ideas have flourished independently from its legal framework. Maṣlaḥa in its capacity has always remained part and parcel of Islamic legal theory, and has been rarely addressed within the frame of economic thought; therefore a new reading is required to deal with the position of economic teachings within Islamic tradition. The paper consists of three sections, whereby the contributions made by Muslim medieval scholars on Islamic economics will be presented. The first chapter provides a historical overview of Islamic law and the concept of maṣlaḥa in relation to the field of Islamic economics, including Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s monumental Iḥya ‘ulūm al dīn, which presents a milestone in converging Sufi ethical teachings of Islam in accordance with the legal methodology of Islamic law. The second part aims to discern and examine the economic jurisprudence and economic theory in Islam as it is understood by some of the mainstream theoreticians of Islamic studies, advocating the view that Islamic economics is inextricably related to the gist of Islamic legal reasoning. In this section the ideas of Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr will be presented as he proposes a new reading of Islamic economics as a doctrine and not a science. The third part questions Islamic legal establishment and its normativity, the claim that legal norms have always been part of the Islamic economic reasoning. This claim rests upon the idea that Islamic legal patterns were also socially constructed, including some aspects of Islamic economic reasoning. Concluding remarks will draw upon the idea that despite the fact that Islamic legal and economic literature are based upon the religious scriptures of Islam, the Qur’an and Tradition, it is more appropriate to claim that they rest upon the ethical cosmology that surpasses purely theological concerns. (shrink)

The paper explores the role and meaning of maṣlaḥa and its possible appropriation in the field of Islamic legal and economic thought, as laid down by various medieval and contemporary Muslim scholars. Questions that are pertinent to the research are the following: how has maṣlaḥa been incorporated in legal reasoning and what kind of meaning does it convey; what type of economic reading does it presuppose; do ethics, law, and scriptural sources play equally important role as reference in developing the (...) concept in economic terms, are some of the questions that this paper will try to provide answer to. Further, as there is a tendency to believe that Islamic economic thought cannot be equated only with legal and juridical underpinnings, it is pertinent to pose a question if economic ideas have flourished independently from its legal framework. Maṣlaḥa in its capacity has always remained part and parcel of Islamic legal theory, and has been rarely addressed within the frame of economic thought; therefore a new reading is required to deal with the position of economic teachings within Islamic tradition. The paper consists of three sections, whereby the contributions made by Muslim medieval scholars on Islamic economics will be presented. The first chapter provides a historical overview of Islamic law and the concept of maṣlaḥa in relation to the field of Islamic economics, including Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s monumental Iḥya ‘ulūm al dīn, which presents a milestone in converging Sufi ethical teachings of Islam in accordance with the legal methodology of Islamic law. The second part aims to discern and examine the economic jurisprudence and economic theory in Islam as it is understood by some of the mainstream theoreticians of Islamic studies, advocating the view that Islamic economics is inextricably related to the gist of Islamic legal reasoning. In this section the ideas of Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr will be presented as he proposes a new reading of Islamic economics as a doctrine and not a science. The third part questions Islamic legal establishment and its normativity, the claim that legal norms have always been part of the Islamic economic reasoning. This claim rests upon the idea that Islamic legal patterns were also socially constructed, including some aspects of Islamic economic reasoning. Concluding remarks will draw upon the idea that despite the fact that Islamic legal and economic literature are based upon the religious scriptures of Islam, the Qur’an and Tradition, it is more appropriate to claim that they rest upon the ethical cosmology that surpasses purely theological concerns. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTwo rival scholars from Shiraz in Persia, Dawānī and Dashtakī engaged in a bitter and extended dispute over a range of metaphysical and logical issues. One of these was the liar paradox. Their debate on this point marked the most extensive scrutiny of the paradox in Arabic until that time. Dashtakī’s solution was to deny that the statement ‘What I say is false’ is true or false, on the ground that there is one statement and one application of the falsity (...) predicate. Given that – ex hypothesi – there is no other statement, there is no basis for a reiteration of the truth or falsity predicate and describing the statement itself as true or false. Dawānī’s solution was to deny that ‘What I say is false’ is a statement at all, and he argued that it is instead akin to a performative utterance such as ‘I hereby sell you this’. (shrink)

The examination of the works and views of Muḥy al-Dīn al-’Arabī’s spiritual heir Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, due to the notorious terseness of his style, is an extremely difficult task. In addition, al-Qūnawī expected the reader to be acquainted with the entire corpus of his works, since many important ideas are mentioned in only one of them, without ever being repeated elsewhere in his writings. In many cases, he limits himself to a brief allusion or hint, without discussing the point at (...) issue in detail. Furthermore, not infrequently he warns the reader that, for certain reasons, one or more important aspects of the issue are not mentioned at all, since they must be kept secret. In his last will, he instructed his.. (shrink)

This text is a bilingual Arabic-English translation of one of the most important metaphysical works of the Persian Muslim philosopher known as Mulla Sadra & Sadr al-Din Muhammad al-Shirazi. In this work Mulla Sadra develops an anti-Platonic philosophical position which is non-Aristotelian. He holds that "existents" are ontologically prior to "essence" & that there are two different realms -- the mind dependent domain & entities which exist independent of the mind. Mulla Sadra's views became very popular among Iranian Muslim philosophers (...) & eventually were instrumental in destroying the Aristotelian school of thought in the Islamic world. The translator, Dr. Parviz Morewedge, is the Secretary-Treasurer of the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy & Science & has published ten books & numerous articles in Islamic Philosophy & Mysticism. (shrink)

We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of (...) freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent. (shrink)

On Qurʼān and its teachings for Muslims and humans.

Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi (1572-1640), more commonly called Mulla Sadra, was one of the grand scholars of later-period Islamic philosophy and has grown to become one of the best-known Muslim philosophers. Iksir al-'arifin, or Elixir of the Gnostics, is unique among Sadra's writings in that it reworks and amplifies an earlier Persian work, the Jawidan-nama ( Book of the Everlasting ) by Afdal al-Din Kashani, or Baba Afdal. The underlying theme of Sadra's amplification is emblematic of Muslim philosophy: the importance (...) of self-knowledge in an individual's journey of "Origin and Return," the soul's origins with God and its eventual return to Him. Everything, Sadra says, is on such a path, gradually disengaging from the material world and returning to a transcendent essence--all leading to a final fruition in which everything in the universe returns to God and finds permanent happiness. Philosophy, Sadra argues, is the most direct means to self-knowledge--and thus the best tool for navigating this journey. (shrink)

In this work the Persian and English texts are edited and published together for the first time. This is Tusi’s major Ismaili work and the most important primary source on Ismaili doctrines during the Alamut period.